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McHone v. Polk
392 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2004)
I. Facts
On June 2, 1990, nineteen-year-old Steven Van McHone and his friends
Jimmy McMillian and Tammy Sawyers embarked on an afternoon of drinking.'
After consuming a great deal of whiskey and several beers, the three drove back
to Mount Airy from Winston Salem, North Carolina, and were stopped in transit
by a state trooper.2 The officer arrested McMillian for driving under the influ-
ence; afterwards, Sawyers drove McHone to his mother's house.3 Around
midnight Sawyers and McHone went to a party, at which McHone consumed
more liquor and beer and acted very erratically, getting into loud arguments and
even pointing an unloaded gun at several party guests.4 When asked by his
girlfriend, Tammy Bryant, to explain his behavior, McHone revealed that he had
taken some hits of LSD. s
After McHone returned home from the party, his mother, step-father, half-
brother, sister-in-law, and nephew arrived at the house from a day of fishing.6
While Wendy, Alex, and Wesley, Jr. got ready for bed, McHone and his mother
began to argue about money.' After the argument, McHone went to his room
in the basement, and Mildred asked Wesley, Jr. if he had seen the family's hand-
gun.' She then left the room.9
1. McHonev. Polk, 392 F.3d 691,714-15,717 n.l1 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
2. Id. at 715.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696; McHone, 392 F.3d at 717 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
6. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696; McHone, 392 F.3d at 713 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). McHone lived with his mother, Mildred Adams, and his step-father, Wesley
Adams, Sr. Id. His half-brother, Wesley Adams, Jr., and Wesley, Jr.'s wife, Wendy, were on leave
from the Air Force and visiting with their son, Alex. Id. Randy Adams, McHone's other half-
brother, was also at the house when the family came home. Id.
7. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696; McHone, 392 F.3d at 713 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). McHone was on probation and had to pay reparations for his prior offense.
Id. at 713 n.2. His mother managed that money. Id.
8. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696; McHone, 392 F.3d at 713 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
9. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696; McHone, 392 F.3d at 713 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Shortly thereafter, the family heard three gunshots from the backyard.
Wesley, Jr. hurried to call the police, while Wesley, Sr. ran to investigate the origin
of the shots. Soon, Wesley, Sr. and McHone reappeared, fighting over a gun.
Wesley, Sr. told Wesley, Jr. to help his mother, who was "facedown out back,"
and continued fighting McHone until he thought he had subdued him. Wesley,
Sr. returned to the kitchen, but McHone soon emerged from the hallway holding
a shotgun. When Wesley, Sr. lunged for the gun, McHone shot him. Wesley, Jr.
then attempted to wrest control of the gun from his half-brother. After ten
minutes of struggling, Wesley, Jr. was able to subdue McHone, who burst into
tears and screamed at Wesley,Jr., demanding that he kill him. Both Mildred and
Wesley, Sr. died from their wounds. °
The State of North Carolina charged McHone with the first-degree murders
of Mildred and Wesley, Sr. and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury on Wesley, Jr." The jury found McHone guilty of each
charge. 2 After a sentencing hearing in which it found one aggravating and eleven
mitigating factors for the murder of Mildred and two aggravating and ten mitigat-
ing factors for the murder of Wesley, Sr., the jury recommended a death sentence
for each murder. 3 The court imposed both death sentences. 4 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina denied McHone's direct and postconviction appeals.'"
Although the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina denied McHone's federal habeas corpus petition, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued McHone a certificate of appeal-
ability for two of his claims: (1) the prosecution withheld material exculpatory
evidence from McHone's trial counsel in violation of Brady v. Maryland;'6 and (2)
McHone's trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective under the standard
announced in Stricklandv. IWasbington 7 in both the guilt and penalty phases of his
trial'" McHone's defense at trial was that he was too intoxicated to have devel-
10. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696; McHone, 392 F.3d at 713-14 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
11. State v. McHone, 435 S.E.2d 296, 298 (N.C. 1993); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2003)
("A murder which shall be perpetrated by ... willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing... shall
be deemed to be murder in the first degree,... and any person who commits such murder shall be
punished with death or imprisonment... for life without parole"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (2003)
(punishing as a class C felony an assault on "another person ... with intent to kill [that] inflicts
serious injury").




16. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
17. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
18. McHone, 392 F.3d at 695-96; see Brief for Appellant at 1, McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691
(4th Cir. 2004), No. 04-14 (on file with author); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984)
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oped the mens rea of specific intent to kill or of premeditation and deliberation;
each of his habeas claims centered around his counsel's failings in mounting this
defense at both the guilt and the sentencing phases of his trial.1 9
IL Holding
The Fourth Circuit rejected McHone's appeal and affirmed the district
court's denial of his habeas corpus petition.2" The court rejected McHone's Brady
claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory witness statements that would
have strengthened his voluntary intoxication defense.21 The court was also
unpersuaded by McHone's Strickland argument that his counsel unreasonably
failed to investigate his lack of ability to form specific intent to kill, to object to
the prosecution's closing argument, and to conduct a thorough mitigation
investigation.' Ultimately, the court held that the district court had correctly
applied the federal habeas corpus standards required by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") because it agreed that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's treatment of McHone's Brady and Strickland




A. The Brady Claim
The Fourth Circuit began by explaining the standard, defined by the United
States Supreme Court in Brady, for determining prosecutorial misconduct in
withholding exculpatory evidence from a defendant.' The court stated the
three-part test for relief: (1) " 'the evidence must befavorabk to the accused' ";
(2) the Government must have suppressed the evidence; and (3) the evidence
must also be material," 'i.e., it must have prejudiced the defense at trial.' ,25 The
(defining the two-pronged standard of deficient performance and prejudice for a finding of
constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (holding
that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
19. McHone, 392 F.3d at 696.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 697-700.
22. Id. at 704-10.
23. Id. at 696.
24. Id. at 697.
25. McHone, 392 F.3d at 697 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)).
2005]
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court then cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Kyles v. Wbitle 6 that such "evi-
dence is material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.' -27 With these rules in mind, the court considered the evidence to which
McHone claimed he should have had access.28
The Fourth Circuit rejected McHone's Brady claims on the grounds that the
evidence he sought was neither favorable nor material.29 McHone argued that
the prosecution should not have withheld statements made to police by Wesley,
Jr., Wendy, Randy, Sawyers, Mark Tuttle, Deputy Inman, and William Kent
Hall.3° McHone claimed that the statements of Wesley, Jr., Wendy, Sawyers,
Inman, and Hall were both favorable and material because they contradicted their
trial testimony and would have provided evidence that they believed that
McHone was more intoxicated than they had indicated to the jury.3' McHone
also argued that the statements of Randy and Tuttle, McHone's Alcoholics
Anonymous ("AA") sponsor, would have shown that McHone was out of
control because of his intoxication and that he had no specific plan to kill his
parents. 32 The court considered the impact that the withheld evidence might
have had on the trial and found that the statements were not strong enough to
impeach the credibility of the State's witnesses or to convince the jury that
McHone was too impaired to have formed the specific intent to kill.
The court also rejected McHone's claim that the cumulative effect of the
withheld evidence would have changed the outcome of his trial and sentencing.
34
Noting that the jury had heard enough evidence to find as a mitigating factor that
McHone was "under the influence of alcohol" during the crime, the court found
that the additional evidence would have had little effect on the jury's determina-
tion that McHone, although drunk, was aware enough of his actions to deserve
a death sentence.35 McHone also presented an affidavit from the State's expert,
Dr. Groce, stating that if he had had access to the withheld evidence, he would
not have testified at the sentencing hearing that McHone could have formed the
specific intent to kill.36 The Fourth Circuit deemed Dr. Groce's postconviction
26. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
27. McHone, 392 F.3d at 697 (quoting Kyes, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (emphasis supplied by Fourth
Circuit)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 703-04.
30. Id. at 697-98.
31. Id. at 697-703.
32. Id. at 701-02.
33. McHone, 392 F.3d at 697-704.
34. Id. at 704.
35. Id. at 703.
36. Id.
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affidavit to be too conclusory to provide McHone with grounds for relief on his
Brady claim.37 In rejecting McHone's Brady arguments on the merits, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina had neither acted contrary to nor unreasonably applied the
federal law governing his claim.
38
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Fourth Circuit identified the standard the United States Supreme Court
laid out in Strickland for evaluating the performance of counsel on a constitu-
tional level.39 Under this standard, the court would find that counsel were
ineffective if their performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness under the circumstances and if the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.4° McHone claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective for their failure
to (1) investigate and present evidence that McHone lacked the specific intent to
kill required for first-degree murder, (2) object to the prosecution's incorrect
statement of the law in closing argument, and (3) investigate mitigation evidence
thoroughly.4 Finding that none of these claims met the prejudice standard
required by Strickland, the court ruled that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
had not applied federal law unreasonably and that McHone was not entitled to
relief under AEDPA.4'
1. Failure to Investigate Inability to Form Specific Intent
The Fourth Circuit did not accept McHone's argument that his counsel
were ineffective for failing to interview a number of people in order to gather
evidence that he was so intoxicated on the night of the crime that he could not
have formed the mens rea required by the first-degree murder statute.43 McHone
claimed that his counsel could have gathered valuable evidence from his AA
sponsor and the two jailors who booked him on the night of the murders that
would have shown that McHone was out of control and "appeared... [to have]
taken some kind of drugs or... consumed a lot of alcohol."'  This evidence
would have clarified his actual level of impairment.45 The Fourth Circuit, how-
37. Id. at 704.
38. Id.
39. McHone, 392 F.3d at 704; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (setting the standard for a court's
review of counsel's performance under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
40. McHone, 392 F.3d at 704.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 706-10.
43. Id. at 704-06.




ever, found that such evidence would have been merely cumulative of the
evidence offered by prosecution witnesses that McHone was indeed drunk. a6
Because the jury had heard evidence of McHone's level of intoxication and still
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to kill, the court
stated, counsel's failure to obtain this evidence could not have been prejudicial.47
The court also found that the evidence that McHone's substance abuse counselor
and probation officer might have offered of McHone's cooperativeness and
obedient nature would have been insufficient to undermine the prosecution's
argument that McHone resented his parents and had planned to kill them for
quite some time."
The court also ruled that McHone's counsel could not have been ineffective
for failing to provide their expert with the information with which he could have
made a blood alcohol content ("BAC") determination that might have lent
credence to McHone's lack of specific intent defense.49 The court concluded that
the expert may have erred by not calculating McHone's BAC from the informa-
tion he received from the State's expert's report and from McHone himself,
especially given the fact that the jury used such evidence to find the statutory
mitigator that McHone was under the influence of alcohol when he committed
the crimes."0 The court, however, would not impute the expert's error to his trial
counsel and thus render them vicariously ineffective."
2. Failure to Object to Prosecution's Misstatement of the Law in Closing Argument
The Fourth Circuit also found insufficient prejudice in McHone's claim that
his counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing
argument.52 In his final argument to the jury, the prosecutor incorrectly stated
the law of voluntary intoxication and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to the defense.53 The prosecution characterized McHone's defense of voluntary
intoxication as an affirmative defense and argued that McHone needed to prove
that "he was so drunk that he was utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and
premeditated purpose to kill.""' The Fourth Circuit pointed out that this inter-
pretation of the law was incorrect and was in fact the standard that a defendant
needed to meet to receive a voluntary intoxication affirmative defense instruction
46. McHone, 392 F.3d at 705.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 705-06.
49. Id. at 706.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. McHone, 392 F.3d at 706-08.




from the court."5 The court showed that under North Carolina law, all McHone
needed to do was to establish a reasonable doubt sufficient to negate the mens rea
of specific intent or premeditation.56 The court pointed to North Carolina
precedent, State v. Mash,"7 to illustrate that a jury " 'need only conclude that
because of his intoxication either defendant did not form the requisite intent or
there is at least a reasonable doubt about it.' "' Although in Mash the legal
misstatement by the prosecution warranted a new trial, the Fourth Circuit held
that McHone's counsel were not ineffective in failing to object because the trial
court cured the prosecutor's mistake with its own instruction that correctly stated
the law. 9 Relying on the presumption that a jury will follow the court's instruc-
tions, the Fourth Circuit found that no prejudice resulted from counsel's error.
60
3. Failure to Investi gate Miigation Evidence
The Fourth Circuit finally rejected McHone's claim, under Wiggins v. Smith,61
that his counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate thoroughly potential
mitigation evidence.62 McHone claimed that with a proper investigation, his
counsel would have found and been able to present to the jury evidence that his
childhood was beset by an alcoholic and violent father, that he was introduced
by his father to alcohol and drugs at an early age, and that he suffered great
emotional instability as a result.63 Relying on the fact that the jury found as
mitigating factors that "the defendant enjoyed a normal childhood until the time
his parents separated, and after that, he began using alcohol and drugs," that
"[diefendant's father abused alcohol and gambled excessively and defendant,
when he was a child, often spent time with his father in bars," that "[d]efendant
often witnessed arguments between his father and mother," and that "[d]efen-
dant, while he resided with his father, often had to reside in undesirable places,"
the Fourth Circuit concluded that McHone's trial counsel had presented suffi-
cient evidence in mitigation to be deemed objectively reasonable.' Because the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 372 S.E.2d 532 (N.C. 1988).
58. McHone, 392 F.3d at 707 (quoting State v. Mash, 372 S.E.2d 532, 537 (N.C. 1988)).
59. Id. at 707-08.
60. Id. at 708; see Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (holding that "[a] jury is
presumed ... to follow [the court's] instructions").
61. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
62. McHone, 392 F.3d at 708-10; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003) (holding that
when considering the effectiveness of counsel's presentation of mitigation evidence in a death
penalty case, "a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel,
but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further").
63. McHone, 392 F.3d at 708-09.
64. Id. at 709.
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jury found these mitigating factors and still imposed the death penalty, the court
found that the lack of further evidence in mitigation also did not prejudice
McHone.
61
IV. Application in Viginia: The Importance of
Effective and I/igilant Trial Presentation
McHone illustrates the importance of trial counsel's presentation to the jury
in a capital case. Despite the fact that the jury found twenty-one total mitigating
factors compared with only three aggravating factors, it still sentenced nineteen-
year-old Steven McHone to death.66 The prosecution presented the jury with the
picture of a resentful son, a kid in trouble with the law, and a violent young man
who indulged in drinking and drugs with little care for the people in his life who
only wanted to help him find his way.67 The prosecution told the jury that
McHone "had a 'plan' to be free of his parents, to rid himself of the confines of
order and discipline."6 The prosecution held McHone in stark contrast to his
upstanding Air Force Captain brother and asked the jury to impose death as the
proper punishment for a son who murdered his mother and step-father in cold
blood in an argument over money.69
Defense counsel needed an alternative picture to stand against the grisly one
painted by the prosecution. With a little more searching, counsel certainly could
have had the ingredients for a powerful story to argue for McHone's life.
McHone's defense team could have argued the tale of a son lost in the shuffle of
alcoholism, abuse, and divorce.7" Instead of growing up with his half-siblings in
an intact family, McHone had to witness the alcoholic rages of his father, some-
times having to sleep in the bars where his father gambled and drank.7 Although
McHone was introduced to alcohol and drugs at an early age and had been in
trouble with the law, his counselors, sponsor, and probation officer also spoke
of a young man who followed directions, asked for permission to stay out late,
and was trying to improve his relationship with his parents.7" Counsel could have
argued that on the night of the murders, McHone had not hatched a carefully
thought-out plan to be rid of his controlling mother and father; he instead had
spent the day drinking and doing drugs.73 After a night of chaos and out of
65. Id. at 710.
66. Id. at 697.
67. McHone, 392 F.3d at 728 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 713.
70. Id. at 727.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 725.
73. McHone, 392 F.3d at 715-18 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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control behavior from the effects of alcohol and LSD, he killed his mother and
his step-father.7 4 Had trial counsel presented this kind of story, the jury might
have been better able to weigh the mitigating against the aggravating factors and
recommended a life sentence.
McHone also underscores the need to be vigilant during the prosecution's
closing argument. Despite the Fourth Circuit's faith in the jury's ability to listen
only to the judge when it comes to matters of law, it is likely that McHone's jury
was influenced by the prosecutor's "several pages" of erroneous instruction on
the law of voluntary intoxication. At the very least, the jury might have been
confused by the contrast between the judge's instruction and the prosecution's
argument and believed that McHone had the burden to prove his utter incapabil-
ity to form intent or premediation.7 6 A timely objection from defense counsel
would have alerted the jury to the prosecutor's error and perhaps made them
more vigilant about their application of law to the facts.
. Conclusion
McHone illustrates several obstacles that a capital defense attorney must
overcome to avoid a death sentence for his or her client. The narrative that
counsel presents is essential to the case for life. Without a strong and cohesive
argument to the jury, otherwise useful evidence can become sanitized and ripe
for the prosecution's molding into a case for death.
Tamara L. Graham
74. Id. at 713-14.
75. Id. at 729.
76. Id.
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